handling receiving WRONGSEC error in compound_encode_decode function by
sending either SECINFO or SECINFO_NONAME op to find out available
security flavors from the server. then try to establish new security
context given the ordered list returned by the server.
Not handling if parent directory doesn't permit a security flavor of
its child directory. Example "/" exported with only auth_sys and
"/sec" exported with only "gss".
proposes an alternate solution for attempts to set file size without an open sta
teid. instead of acquiring one by sending OPEN, fail the request with ACCESS_DE
NIED
according the MS File System Algorithms documentation for setting FileAllocation
Information and FileEndOfFileInformation [http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/librar
y/ff469355%28v=PROT.10%29.aspx]:
"If Open.GrantedAccess does not contain FILE_WRITE_DATA, the operation MUST be f
ailed with STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED"
-removes open_owner_id, access_mask, access_mode from setattr upcall arguments
-moves map_access_2_allowdeny() back to open.c as a static function, since handl
e_setattr() was its only other call site
nfs41_name_cache_lookup() was returning FILE_NOT_FOUND on negative entries, but still copying the target filehandle
Signed-off-by: Casey Bodley <cbodley@citi.umich.edu>
zero-length ranges: valid on windows, but nfs servers MUST return NFS4ERR_INVAL for LOCK with length=0. use MRxIsLockRealizable() to return STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED for zero-length ranges (avoiding the lock upcall and rpc)
ranges that extend past UINT64_MAX: not valid on windows. NFS expects length=UINT64_MAX for locking to end-of-file. use length=UINT64_MAX if length >= UINT64_MAX-offset (making lock ranges consistent with linux client)
Signed-off-by: Casey Bodley <cbodley@citi.umich.edu>
if during recv we received an error, then propagate that to the caller.
otherwise, do time out check. also do timeout check if the thread's xid
didn't match received xid (making sure we'll timeout if we have a starving
thread that will never receive a reply)
if we are doing CREATE_NEW file creation, then based on whether or not
we have a persistent session, we'll send either GUARDED4 create for
persistent session and EXCLUSIVE4_1 create otherwise.
if we receive an rpc_autherr, just recreate a new rpc client as well
as the rpc auth structure. as it ties into the recovery and handles
that only one thread recovers and reestablishes the rpc auth context.
in theory, reestablishing rpc client does not necessitate new rpc auth
context. we really need to restablish one only if we get rpc autherr. however,
it simplifies the code not to introduce a different synchronization
mechanism for rpc auth in addition to the rpc one.
once libtirpc blocking recv was changed to a polling receive,
we no longer had a timeout mechanims on waiting for a reply.
solution: save a timestamp before the recv call, on each async recv return
check if the time lapsed does not exceed the timeout value. when timeout
is reach, return TIMEDOUT rpc error.
every upcall (except few) pass session and open_state pointer, so
add that to marshal_nfs41_header() in the driver. remove passing
of session and open_state elsewhere in marshal functions.
in the deamon, upcall.c now reads and stores pointers to session
and open_state in nfs41_upcall datastructure instead of having
each individual upcall store their own pointers. setattrl
and readdir args keeping pointer because the rest of the code
uses them a lot.
in upcall_parse() up refcounts on session and open_state if
valid handles were passed in. down refcounts upcall_cleanup() as
before. but need to be careful with count value for mount and open
upcalls. we need to take an extra ref because upcall_cleanup() now
will always decrement it.
reformated some of the old functions.
finalized mapping functions for windows to nfs4 access mask bits.
satisfying nfs41_acl_query for dacl.
when doing setacl and creating "who" field of the format user@nfs4domain,
use dns domain name of the windows client machine
instead of passing sids for the owner and group, create a security
descriptor and pass that back. this way we can add all the security
information that was queried in the daemon and pass a fully formed
security descriptor back to the kernel.
notice: irp_mj_query_security provides a pointer to the buffer that
suppose to hold the security descriptor. that memory is valid only
in the context of the process doing the security irp. we can't use
this pointer in then upcall entry and try to write the security
descriptor directly there as we process the downcall. that leads
to kernel oops.
thus we have to first allocate memory to hold the security descriptor
then copy bytes passed to us from the daemon. then do another copy
with the context of the security irp.
this commit does NOT have correct windows to nfs4 acl mappings but
rather has the wrapper functions defined for mapping them.
cthon tests still work with these mappings.
nfs41_cb_session stores the last cb_compound reply (whether or not cachethis was set) to handle retry attempts, along with the cb_compound arguments for improved NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY detection
Signed-off-by: Casey Bodley <cbodley@citi.umich.edu>
acls are lists of arbitrary length, so xdr_array() is used to allocate the array
during decode. because this memory is allocated by the tirpc library, it needs
to be freed there as well; added function nfsacl41_free() to do this with XDR_F
REE
Signed-off-by: Casey Bodley <cbodley@citi.umich.edu>
Basic handling of owner and group security query (no dacl).
Added new upcall for NFS41_ACL_QUERY (driver and daemon code).
Daemon, upon getting NFS41_ACL_QUERY first places a getattr that has
owner, group attribute request. We currently don't cache them!!!
Then, we parse nfs4name format (ie user@domain or group@domain)
into user and domain. We currently ignore domain part!!!
Then, we assume that whatever we are mapping is "known" locally
(ie LookupAccountName() api which retrieves a SID for a given name).
Mapping from name to SID can only be done in the userland. We then
copy the bytes via the upcall pipe to the kernel. If the received
user or group cant be mapped via LookupAccoundName(), we create a
well known null SID as the reply.
Kernel creates a security descriptor in the absolute-format and adds
owner and group sids to it. Important: RtlSetOwner/Group functions only
work with absolute-format security descriptor, however the reply to the
user needs to be in the self-relative format.
The way security query works is that it passes us a buffer to be filled
with the security context. However the user doesn't know how big the
buffer should be so, the user is allowed to pass a null buffer and have
the kernel return how much memory is needed. This leads to 2 security
queries => 2 NFS41_ACL_QUERY upcalls => 2 getattr rpcs... It should be
improved.
TODO:
- need to add caching of owner/group attributes for a file?
- need to add calls to LDAP for more general mapping?
- need to cache reply of the ACL if supplied length is 0?
adding a check to see if the destination filename is currently opened by
looking through the list of open states stored for a given client.
fail rename with ERROR_FILE_EXISTS if we find an open.
